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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MERIEL M. HACKING,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Docket No. 16821

v.
RULON C. HACKING,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for divorce by the Plaintiff-Respondent
Meriel M. Hacking from her husband, Rulon
Defendant-Appellant.
record as follows:

c.

Hacking, the

(Respondent shall cite to pages in the
Trial transcript, "Tr--," and. Court file,

"R--. II)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's decision
and Findings and an award for Respondent's attorneys fees
incurred on appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After approximately 27 years of marriage, the PlaintiffRespondent Meriel M. Hacking was granted a divorce from the
Defendant-Appellant Rulon C. Hacking (hereinafter sometimes
referred to by his common nickname, "Jude Hacking") pursuant
to a Partial Decree entered by the trial court on March 22,
1979.

(Partial 'Decree, R. 86)

Findings of cruelty were made
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by the court supporting the Partial Decree.

(Findings, R. 84)

No appeal has been taken by Appellant from these Findings or
that Decree.

The trial court therein specifically reserved

for trial at a later date the issues of division of the
property, permanent alimony and support and attorneys fees.
Thereafter, following a two-day trial on the issues
~eserved,

the Honorable George E. Ballif filed his Memorandum

Decision on September 4, 1979.

(R. 92)

Judgment and Findings

were entered thereon on September 20, 1979.

(R. 96-112)

Following Appellant's Motion to Amend, the court entered
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended
Judgment on October 10, 1979.

(R. 135, 146)

Except for

certain specific items, the court awarded the marital property
equally as tenants in common to both parties, subject to the
outstanding obligations.

(R. 147)

Respondent was awarded the

home furnishings while Appellant was awarded all interest in
the Ouray Brine Company which was organized by Appellant with
his eldest son.

(R. 136, 146; Tr. 162-71)

Among the properties divided equally between the parties
included the family ranch and livestock operation, the home
and a hamburger drive-in.

The Appellant appeals,from this

portion of the court's decision.

Contrary to Appellant's

suggestion (Appellant's Brief, p. 1), the trial court did not
purport to divide or adjudicate property interests owned by
the Appellant's mother, Vera Hacking.

(Tr. 275-76)

The court awarded to Respondent alimony until December,
1980, and child support for the minor diabetic child.

(R. 149)
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However, Respondent was required to pay her own costs and
attorneys fees.

(R. 149)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent takes issue with Appellant's statements of
fact as being incomplete and interspersed with Appellant's
conclusions and opinions in an attempt to reargue the evidence.
Appellant states only those facts favorable to his contentions
to the exclusion of evidence supporting the Findings and
Judgment of the trial court.

Therefore, Respondent provides

the following statements of facts and corrections of
Appellant's statements:
The parties were married in December, 1950, live in
Vernal, Utah, and, during their marriage, acquired substantial
property.

(Tr. 27; R. 214)

Five children were born during

the marriage: Mitchell (Mitch)

(1952), Susan (1953, Rodney

{1955), Shara (1960) and Sonya (1967).

(Complaint, R. 1)

Except for Mitch, the children still reside with Respondent.
(Findings, R. 84)
At the time of the marriage, Appellant's father, Rulon

s.

Hacking, had purchased and was still buying ranch land upon

which approximately $9,000.00 was owing on the purchase loan.
{Tr. 28-29)

At some time, Appellant and his father agreed

that if Jude would stay and run the ranch that after the loans
were paid off, the parties would receive part ownership of the
ranch and some day it would all belong to them.
227, 276-7)

(Tr. 47-48,

This "partnership" agreement was explained to and

discussed between Appellant and Respondent over the years.
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Tr. 276-7)
Accordingly, in 1968 Appellant's parents, Rulon S. and
Vera, conveyed to Appellant an undivided one-half interest in
a portion of the ranch property known as the "Diamond Mountain
property."

(Exh. 4)

Appellant still claims that pursuant to

that "agreement," he is entitled to receive the remaining onehalf interest for his services in operating the ranch after
his marriage to Respondent.

(Tr. 48-50)

In 1957, during the early period of the marriage,
Appellant and his father purchased, as tenants in common, from
Appellant's uncle an additional 1,057 acres of ranch property
on Diamond Mountain.

(Exh. 3; Tr. 342)

the note for its purchase.

(Tr. 308)

Respondent also signed
In connection with the

ranch operation, Appellant and his father also acquired various
government grazing permits and leases.

(Tr. 342; Exh. 4)

Later, the parties purchased a 5% interest in the Uintah Basin
Grazing Association, 108 acres of land in Coal Mine Basin; and
Appellant purchased stock in Hiko Bell (60,000 shares) and
Dinah Bowl.
(Tr. 51, 68)

Title to these assets are in Appellant's name.
The parties also purchased 54 acres known as the

Allen place, the Maeser home where the parties resided and a
hamburger drive-in.
tenancy.

Title to these properties is in joint

{Tr. 68-69)

From 1950 to 1969, Mr. Hacking was employed full-time by
McCullough Tool Company.

(Tr. 29)

Respondent was employed in

several jobs in the Vernal area, except for periods during the
birth of two children in 1952 and 1953.

Following each birth,
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Respondent returned to work with the encouragement of her
husband.

(Tr. 214-15)

a government office.

In 1962 Respondent began employment in
Respondent continued with this job until

the birth in 1967 of their diabetic daughter, Sonya.

Contrary

to the claims in Appellant's Brief, the evidence was undisputed
that all of Respondent's income was put in the parties' joint
bank account and went "to pay off the home and help support
the family."

(Tr. 215)

In about 1963, Appellant purchased a one-half interest in
an A&W hamburger drive-in.

(Tr. 216)

Although the drive-in

was initially managed by its co-owner, Mr. Merkley, Respondent
was called in "a lot" to help in the drive-in in addition to
her full-time employment and family duties.

(Tr. 216)

In

1969, Appellant quit McCullough Tool Company and the parties
acquired the other one-half interest in the drive-in, title to
the property being taken in the names of both Appellant and
Respondent.

Since 1970, Mrs. Hacking has managed the drive-in

on a full-time basis to produce income to support the Hacking
family and the ranch.

(Tr. 217, 227, 299, 342)

Respondent

often worked at nights while also taking care of Sonya, whose
diabetic condition often required constant care.

(Tr. 227-9)

The rest of the family, including Appellant, also assisted in
the operation of the drive-in as well as the ranch.

(Tr. 156,

345-6)
The statement in Appellant's Brief that the "unwillingness
of Respondent to continue to operate the drive-in business led
the trial court to conclude" it should be sold is a self-serving
5
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and misleading conclusion by Appellant which ignores his
assertion that he didn't want to operate the drive-in either.
{Appellant's Brief, p. 4; Tr. 341)
of numerous specific factors

Mrs. Hacking did testify

(e.g., more modern competition,

obsolescence, fuel shortages and road construction) indicating
the declining value of the drive-in as an investment and a
source of income.

(Tr. 221-4, 226-7, 289-92, 341)

The yearly

net income from the drive-in has steadily declined from
$33,134.00 in 1975 to $1,624.00 in 1978.

(Exh. 22; Tr. 316-19)

The Ranch Operation
In addition to their separate employment and the operation
of the A&W drive-in, Appellant and Respondent and the children
all worked together in the family ranching operation.
32-3, 153-6, 161, 226, 269-70, 310)

{Tr.

From about 1970 until

1978 when Appellant set up the Ouray Brine Company, Appellant
generally supervised the ranch.

(Tr. 155-165)

Respondent and

the children have also worked hard to make the ranch.successful.
(Tr. 360-1)

Contrary to his claim that the ranch's expansion

is to his credit, Appellant admitted that the drive-in money
was "plowed in" to the ranch over the years, thereby,
presumably, helping to make expansion possible.

(Tr. 35)

And,

during this period, Respondent's efforts supported the family.
(Tr. 34, 215, 217-8, 341-2)
Although Appellant's "facts" attempt to minimize as
"occasional" the participation in the ranch by Respondent and
the children and to ignore their substantial contributions,
the record contains more than sufficient evidence to support
6 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the trial court's finding that "the parties have worked
together in acquiring various assets . .
prise.

.

"

• as a family enter-

(R. 135, Finding #1; Tr. 32, 35, 153-7, 197,

217, 219, 225-26, 270, 299, 308-12, 361)
In addition to providing funds for the ranch's operation
and expansion, Respondent signed notes and has been personally
liable for the yearly ranch loans from the PCA and on the
purchase money note for the purchase of part of the "Diamond
Mountain property."

(Tr. 35, 83, 91-2, 308-12, 216)

Respondent and the children always participated in cattle
drives such as from Diamond Mountain to the Coal Mine Basin,
often walking on foot.

(Tr. 219)

Respondent has fed and cared

for the horses used on the ranch and helped with regular
ranching and cattle chores.

(Tr. 270)

On occasions Mr. Hacking

has referred to the ranch and cattle as being Mrs. Hacking's.
(Tr. 277-78)

Although the children worked hard on the ranch

and earned wages which were reported as income on their tax
returns (as much as $9,000.00 in 1973), the money was not paid
to them but was left in the ranch to be otherwise used in
building up its operating capital.

(Tr. 360).

These specific

examples are uncontroverted but are completely ignored in
Appellant's Statement of Facts.
Since February, 1978, the ranch has been managed by the
eldest son, Mitch, who is responsible for its day-to-day
operations.

(Tr. 58, 156, 270)

While, naturally, the parties

are not always in agreement, even since their separation
Respondent has worked satisfactorily with Appellant and their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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son in cooperating in the financial and business affairs of
the ranch.

(Tr. 225, 270-1, 166, 192, 306)

The other adult

children, although pursuing their education and other interests,
still are involved in helping at the ranch and the drive-in.
(Tr. 157-58, 197, 218, 226, 270)
The "substantial evidence" upon which Appellant relies to
claim that he is "the most capable to operate the ranch," that
Respondent is incapable or that the operation cannot be divided
are merely his self-serving opinions.

(Tr. 334, 339)

The

"substantial" testimony is to the contrary.
Much of the ranch properties, including Diamond Mountain,
were previously owned by various members of the Rulon S.
Hacking family (Appellant's father).

The fences from previous

family divisions of the same property are still there and can
be used again to divide the property, if necessary.
207-212, 304-305)

(Tr.

Grazing lands and permits, as well as the

livestock and land, can be physically separated or operated
together.
past.

(Tr. 281-2, 186-7)

{Tr. 188)

They have so operated in the

The farm machinery, which at trial Appellant

opined was "junk," is operable and can be physically divided.
{Tr. 70, 294, 181-2, 294)

Whatever physical labor and equip-

ment may be needed to help Respondent is available from
Respondent's family.

(Tr. 204-8, 210-11, 286)

In fact,

Respondent's brother, Bill Murray, has helped the Hackings
harvest corn in the past.

(Tr. 204)

The Ouray Brine Company
Not surprisingly, Appellant's Brief does not mention the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Ouray Brine Company, a business enterprise which Appellant has
developed since 1978 and which the court awarded separately to
him.

(Findings 2, 3: Tr. 136, 147)
In February, 1978, Appellant left his full-time management

of the ranching operations and that responsibility was delegated
to Mitch with "no strings attached."

(Tr. 156, 201, 332)

Appellant took employment as a "shop hand" for Delgarno
Transportation with a gross income of $18,000.00 a year.
(Ans. to Int. R. 33-34: Tr. 55-6)
In June, 1978, Appellant formed the Ouray Brine Company,
a business, since operated by Appellant, to haul brine and oil
to and from the nearby oil fields.

(Tr. 56-7, 61-3)

Appellant claimed that although he was operating the brine
company, legal title thereto was in Mitch.

(Tr. 339-40, 167)

However, there was contradicting evidence that it was
Appellant's idea for the business: and Appellant wanted Mitch
involved to keep the business out of the divorce.
165, 173)

(Tr. 59,

Appellant has made all the contacts with customers.

(Tr. 347-8, 168).

Mitch Hacking's involvement is to supply

his signature when required.

(Tr. 169-70, 172, 174)

The

business records are kept by Appellant and are in his
possession.

(Tr. 59-60, 170-1)

Appellant has hired as a

"bookkeeper" and pays a salary to Marilyn Caldwell, who was
referred to as Appellant's girlfriend.

(Tr. 169, 171)

Appellant personally guaranteed the purchase of equipment,
i~cluding a truck purchased from proceeds of the sale of ranch

cattle.

(Tr. 61, 76, 176-79)

The business was not registered

9
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with the Secretary of State.

(Tr. 65)

The trial court found that although evidence showed the
legal title to belong to Mitch, "an exchange of jobs between
the Defendant and Mitchell appears to be for convenience and
appearances only and does not affect the true equitable ownership of the business."

(Finding #2, Tr. 136)

Nevertheless,

because the business was developed when the parties were
separated, the court awarded the entire property to Appellant
as his separate"property.

(Finding #3, ibid.)

Although

Respondent has not cross appealed from the trial court's
finding to award this business to Appellant, Respondent does
point to the fact that (1) Appellant received more than onehalf of the total assets of the parties; and (2) Appellant was
awarded a going business which presently occupies nearly all
of his time and attention.

10
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
It is apparent that the object of Appellant's Brief is
to reargue the weight of the evidence.

Appellant asks this

Court to accept his testimony, resolve all the disputed issues
and facts in his favor where there is a conflict in the
evidence and ignore the substantial evidence supporting the
trial court's findings and decision.
Appellant gives lip service to, but completely disregards,
the rule of law that the trial court's findings are endowed
with a presumption of validity and will not be disturbed
because an appellant views the facts differently.
Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974)
431 P.2d 802 (1967).

J

Searle v.

Stone v. Stone, 19 U.2d 378,

On appeal this Court will review the

evidence in the light most favorable to support the findings
of the trial court.

Cook v. Gardner, 14 U.2d 193, 381 P.2d

78 (1963).
The trial court is in an advantaged position in factual
matters, particularly in dividing the assets of a marriage.
Considerable deference is given to the findings and judgment
of that court.

It is the prerogative of the trial judge to

judge the creditability of witnesses, observe their demeanor
and conduct in testifying and give to the testimony such weight
as the trier of fact deems it is entitled.

If there should be

conflict in the evidence, the Supreme Court assumes that the
11
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trial court believed the evidence supporting the findings.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, #16407, July 18, 1980 (Utah); Stone v.
Stone, supra; Child v. Child, 8 U.2d 261, 267, 332 P.2d 981
(1958).
The burden is on the Appellant to show error.

Mitchell

--

v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974); Stone v. Stone, supra.
The question on appeal is not what the trial court could have
done but were the findings supported by the evidence.

As

particularly set forth and cited in Respondent's Statement of
Facts (and throughout this Brief) , the Findings and Judgment
were amply and substantially supported by the evidence.
Appellant cannot reargue the weight of the evidence by selected
testimony and opinion which do not comport to all the facts.
Failing to prevail in the lower court, Appellant may not recite
his evidence favorable to his contentions to the exclusion of
evidence supporting the lower court's findings.

Thompson v.

Condas, 27 U.2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972).
Appellant complains that the Findings of the court did
not "recite specific findings to justify its general conclusion
." or specifically find that Appellant's proposed distribution of assets was unjust.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 14)

is merely an assertion without substance.

This

A finding that the

parties worked together in acquiring and developing a family
enterprise adequately supports the court's ultimate conclusion
that the parties should each receive a one-half interest therein.

A trial court need not make specific "negative" findings.

(Findings, #1; R. 135-6)

Findings should be limited to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
12
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ultimate facts.

If they ascertain ultimate facts and conform

to the pleadings and supporting evidence, they are regarded
as sufficient.

They will support the judgment, though they

are "very general."

Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082

(Utah, 19 7 7 ) .
Respondent submits that Appellant's Brief does not show
any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

That court has

wide discretion to divide the properties in a manner fair and
equitable for the protection and welfare of both parties.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra, and cases cited therein; Slaughter

v. Slaughter, 18 U.2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966).

The decision

of the trial court should be affirmed.

13
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
THE MARITAL PROPERTY EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS
TENANTS IN COMMON.
As previously noted, the lower court awarded Appellant
his interest in the brine company, which business Appellant
operates full-time.
to Respondent.

The household furnishings were awarded

The remaining properties were divided equally

between the parties, each party to receive a one-half interest
in common.
Appellant's sole contention is that the court abused its
discretion when it did not award him the ranch properties and
equipment outright.

Appellant seems to be of the opinion that

the court was obliged to accept whatever Appellant asserted
was "fair and equitable" to him to the exclusion of any other
considerations.

However, the court has the discretion to

divide the marriage property in a fair and equitable manner
for the protection of both parties.

After due consideration

to all the evidence and various factors, it was not an abuse
for the court to refuse to divide the properties in a manner
Appellant believed most beneficial to him.

(R. 92, 95)

Lowery v. Lowery, #16170, (Utah, filed Dec. 4, 1979).
At the trial court's request, each party proposed to the
court a division of the assets.

(R. 12-16, 17-24, 272-95)

Respondent's proposed division is Exhibit 20.
proposal is Exhibit 1.

Appellant's

In arriving at its decision, the trial

court did not completely accept the proposal of either party,
obviously giving consideration to the interests and equities
14
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of each.

The court was entitled to compare and evaluate the

evidence regarding the following factors:
1.

Respondent's contributions to and sacrifices in the

marriage and in acquiring and developing the ranch and other
assets.

(Tr. 32, 34-5, 83, 91-2, 155, 213-20, 227-29, 270-77,

308, 312, 342, 360-1)
2.

The physical and mental health of the parties.

(Tr.

265-8, 337-8, 345)
3.
parties.

The relative education, training and ability of the
(Tr. 34, 165, 168-79, 190, 193, 204-211, 215, 217,

221-24, 299, 341)
4.

The duration of the marriage: 28 years and the age of

the parties (approximately 45 years).
5.

(R. l; Tr. 213)

The present income of the parties and the property

acquired and owned either jointly or by each one, including
Appellant's interest in the brine company and the present value
of the drive-in.
6.

(Tr. 127, 291-2, 319)

The definite expectancy of Appellant in his mother's

estate as a future contingency.
7.

(Tr. 48-9)

Their obligations to and needs of the children, all

of whom, except for Mitch, reside with Respondent (Findings,
R. 84), particularly the needs of Sonya.
17, 18)

(Tr. 227-29; Exhs.

Harding v. Harding, 26 U.2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971);

MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 581-2, 236 P.2d 1066
(1951); Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U.2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956).

This

Court has also stated that consideration may also be given to
the "relative loyalty or disloyalty of the parties to their
15
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marriage vows and their relative guilt or innocence in causing
the breakup of the marriage."

Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697,

699 (Utah, 1974); Wilson v. Wilson, supra, at p. 82.
R. 84)

(Findings,

There is no abuse of discretion when the trial court

has given "conscientious and judicious consideration" to these
various factors.

Slaughter v. Slaughter, supra.

In spite of

the overwhelming evidence, cited herein, which supports the
court's decision, Appellant still argues that his testimony
was "substantial."
It is interesting to note that in the lower court,
Appellant admitted that his wife was entitled to one-half the
assets of the family operation.

(Tr. 355-56, 375)

Even

Appellant's counsel agreed that the court's suggestion of
dividing property equally was a "possible" alternative and
further conceded that "there are dozens of ways" in which the
property can be split up.
to pick "the very best."

The question, counsel stated, is
(Tr. 376)

Appellant claimed his

proposal was "the very best," which it no doubt was for his
own interests.

If Appellant's proposal of an "equal" division

of property is fair and equitable to both parties, then
Appellant should be willing to take the "equal" portion he
allocated to Respondent and let Respondent have that portion
which Appellant allocated himself on Exhibit 1.
Yet, Appellant refused.

(Tr. 272}

(Tr. 355-57)

Also, Appellant says he does not now dispute the award
to him of one-half of the A&W drive-in.
pp. 4-5}

(Appellant's Brief,

Apparentl1j he claims that an "equal" division requires

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
16provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he also receive all the ranch properties and assets, as well as
his present brine company business. a11d one-half of the drive-in.
Obviously, Appellant agrees with Respondent's testimony
that the "Diamond Mountain" ranch property is the "cream" of
the ranch property with recreation, hunting, fishing opportunities.
(Tr. 278-9)

The self-interests of Appellant are even more

apparent considering the substantial differences between the
parties as to the values of such assets as the cattle and the
drive-in.

(Exhs. 1, 20, 9)

It is patently ridiculous to argue

that to give the Diamond Mountain property to Appellant and a
declining asset (the drive-in) to Respondent is "equal" or "fair."
Respondent submits that the trial court acted clearly within its discretion in dividing equally the interests in the
ranch and other assets as tenants in common.

This Court has

heretofore affirmed a decision of this trial court in dividing
marriage property equally, including ranch properties.
v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974).

Searle

Also see Naylor v. Naylor,

563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977); English v. English, 565 P.2d (Utah,
1977); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979); Kerr v.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah, 1980); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d
491 (Utah, 1975).

In each of these cases (and others cited by

Appellant as authority for his ·assertion that the lower court
abused its discretion), this Court affirmed the trial court's
exercise of that discretion.

See, also, Pope v. Pope, 589

P.2d 752 (1978).
In Searle, the trial court found that the property in the
names of either or both of the par tie's was accumulated "as a
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result of the joint efforts of the parties.

"

The

testimony of each side as to properties and their values was
"contradictory and ambiguous."

The court divided the ranch

property equally, giving the husband an option to purchase the
wife's portion.

(522 P.2d, at 698-9)

awarded a separate business.

The husband was also

The husband argued, just as

Appellant argues here, that his wife was not entitled to onehalf of the assets accumulated during the marriage and that an
equitable distribution would be to award him "all of the
businesses and the ranching property . . . . "
699)

This Court held that the Honorable Judge Ballif had not

abused the "broad discretion reposed in him."
700)

(522 P.2d, at

(522 P.2d, at

There is no material distinction between Searle and the

Findings and Judgment of Judge Ballif here.
In English v. English, supra, at 565-66, this Court
affirmed the trial court's decision to divide commercial
property between the husband and wife as tenants in common,
subject to the outstanding debts.
In the instant case, as a tenant in common, Appellant may
seek a partition as provided by law if he determines he cannot
get along with Respondent in the operation of the ranch.
is not "forced into a partnership."

(Judgment, R. 149)

He
There

is no abuse of discretion in making the parties tenants in
common of an on-going business or of business property.
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 600 P.2d 1183 (Mont., 1979); Propper v.
Propper, 221 N.W.2d 566 (Minn., 1974); Lee v. Lee, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 1123, 398 N.E.2d 126, 132-34 (1979); Nelson v. Nelson,
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590 S.W.2d 293 (Ark., 1980); In the Matter of the Marriage of
Trujillo, 580 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App., 1979); Levin v. Levin,
43 Md. App. 380, 405 A.2d 770, 775-77 (1979); Smith v. Smith,
535 P.2d 1109 (Ha., 1975).

An Illinois Appellate Court held

it was error not to award the wife a joint interest in the
husband's grain elevator business to which she had made
contribution of funds and labor.

Leone v. Leone, 39 Ill. App.

3d 547, 350 N.E.2d 545 (1976).
Appellant argues that Respondent arbitrarily refuses to
cooperate with Appellant in operating the ranch and that their
son, Mitch, must referee and resolve their differences.

He

also asserts that there is no evidence to "suggest" that the
parties can work together, "even under LMitch'~7 benevolent
stewardship."

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-7)

Again, Appellant

entirely ignores the evidence supporting the trial court and
selects certain portions out of context.

(E.g., Tr. 186-88,

198-201)
While there are differences, Mrs. Hacking and the children
continue to make significant contributions to a cooperative
and efficient management of the ranch.

They have "a good

working relationship" satisfactory to Respondent and to
Mitchell.

(Tr. 157, 161, 166, 193, 199, 269-72)

desires to keep the ranch intact and operating.
306)

(Tr. 279, 304,

If their interests are together, there is not much

trouble.
1978.

Respondent

(Tr. 207)

In fact, the ranch has so operated since

(Tr. 186-88)
If Appellant believes the ranch cannot be operated in
19
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cooperation, it must be a result of his apparent unwillingness
If that be the case, he may seek for

(Tr. 339, 77)

to do so.

partition of the ranch.

Contrary to Appellant's claims, the

interests of the parties can be separated and divided.
187-88)

Much of the equipment isn't presently used and can

be divided.
divided.

(Tr.

(Tr. 180-2)

Cattle and grazing permits can be

(Tr. 186-7, 282)

The Diamond Mountain property can

be physically separated into parcels already divided by
existing fences.

(Tr. 206-12)

Respondent has available the

assistance and equipment to operate on her own, if necessary.
(Tr. 204-210, 280, 305)

While Appellant says there is

substantial evidence to the contrary, the only such testimony was
Appellant's own general denial.

(Tr. 334)

Also, contrary to Appellant's conclusions, the court did
not force Mitchell into participating in the management.
Mitch testified he was asked by his father to manage the ranch-"no strings attached."

(Tr. 200-1)

Following his testimony

that he would be willing to continue to operate the ranch,
Mitch also agreed that:

!_By Mr.

Nielse~7

Q

If you were operating the ranch, it wouldn't present
any problem to you, would it?

A

No.

Q

As a matter of fact, that is the way you have been
operating with your 50 head of cattle mixed in with
the families /sic7 operation for the last several
years, isn't Tt?-

A

Correct.

20
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Q

You have been using part of the A.U.M.'s that don't
belong to you? You have been using the feed from the
Allen place, and so on, haven't you?

A

Correct.

Q

And that has not interferred with the management and
operation of the ranch, has it?

A

No.

(Tr. 188)
Appellant quotes Mitchell's testimony out of context in
efforts to accentuate, as fact, Appellant's opinions as to family
conflict and bitterness.
/_By Mr. Howar£!7
Q

Now, I know that you have a high regard for your
mother and father, and I would have no doubt about
that, and you don't either, do you?

A

No.

Q

And it's an unfortunate situation that you find
yourself in?

A

I

Q

Well, I don't think they are going to feel badly
toward you, either one of them.

just don't know how they will feel about me when
this is over.

(Tr. 198)
Appellant's specious attempt to equate a tenancy in common
with a partnership is a mere smokescreen to cloud the obvious
equities of the trial court's decision.
is not a "partnership."

A tenancy in common

The court has not in any way imposed

an involuntary partnership upon Appellant.

As noted, if

dissatisfied with common ownership of the ranch assets,
Appellant may seek partition.

But he cannot create the

appearances that he is an unwilling "partner," handcuffed to
21
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a former spouse.

Such a position indicates a surprising

ignorance of the relevant principles of law.

Rocky Mountain

Stud Farm v. Lunt, 46 Utah 299, 151 Pac. 521 (1951); Garner v.
Anderson, 67 Utah 553, 248 Pac. 496 (1926); Bussell v. Barrz,
61 Ida. 216, 102 P.2d 276 (1940); 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership,
§11, pp. 936-7.

Appellant does not cite any authority to

support his claims here.
The record herein, when considered in full, provides no
support for any claim that there will inevitably be further
unmanageable difficulties and distress between the parties.
Nor was there any misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law by the trial court.
P.2d 221 (1967).

DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 426

The only case cited by Appellant wherein the

lower court abused its discretion was Read v. Read, 594 P.2d
871 (Utah, 1979) .

In Read, this Court said it was inequitable

to award 90% of the assets to the wife when the apparent
purpose was to punish the defendant husband.
In the instant matter, Respondent suggests that the
apparent purpose of the Defendant-Appellant is to ignore the
substantial contributions to and investment in the marriage
by the Respondent now that it is time to distribute the
dividends.

Respondent has just as equal a right as Appellant

has to reconstruct her life on a happy and useful basis.
Gramme v. Gramme, supra, at 148.
Since Point II of Appellant's argument (Appellant's Brief,
p. 12) is merely repetitious of Point I, Respondent has not
discussed that point separately.
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Considering the record and facts of this case, the trial
court did not abuse its broad discretion in dividing the
property equally between the parties as tenants in common.
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT
FOR THE MINOR, DIABETIC CHILD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
In his Docketing Statement, Appellant takes issue with
the portion of the trial court's decision awarding child
support for the minor, diabetic child, Sonya, until she reaches
21 years, unless otherwise ordered.
Docketing Statement, p. 3)

(R. 149; Appellant's

Since Appellant did not discuss

this point in his Brief, Respondent presumes he has abandoned
the issue.

See, also, Section 15-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
POINT IV

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
INCURRED ON APPEAL.
Respondent submits that she is entitled to an award of
attorneys fees incurred in this appeal, particularly considering
the appellate record herein and the lack of support in the trial
court record for Appellant's appeal here.

This Court may make

such an award of attorneys fees to the wife for defending an
appeal by the husband.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate &

Investment co., 3 U.2d 121, 123, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); 5 Am. Jur.

2d, Appeal and Error, §1022.

Or, this Court may remand to the

trial court for such an award.

Gramme v. Gramme, supra, per

curiam; Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah, 1976).
23
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CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion awarding the
lssets equally between the parties as tenants in common.

Its

rudgment and Findings should be affirmed and Respondent should
)e awarded her attorneys fees incurred herein.
Respectfully submitted,

ArthuC~--

Clark R. Nielsen
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON &
400 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Responde
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent by
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